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This paper presents statistics which confirm the existence
of minimum hours constraints for jobs held by a majority of prime
aged male workers who are not self emoloyed. It then considers
the implications of these constraints for studies of retirement
behavior and related policy analyses. Potential biases associated
with conventional analyses, which either ignore the existence of
minimum hours constraints or assume they are pervasive, are dis-
cussed in the context of structural life cycle retirement models.
A more realistic but still imperfect specification, which can be
estimated given available data, assumes minimum hours constraints
on the main job and variable hours elsewhere.






(603) 646—2531Economists have devoted a great deal of effort to studying the
basic retirement model and to analyzing the roles of public and private
pensions in influencing retirement decisions. Unraveling the complex
set of incentives created by the Social Security System and by a variety
of private pension programs has proved to be a very difficult task.1
Analyses of the budget line facing the potential retiree have been conducted in
the context of retirement models with specifications that have become
increasingly sophisticated over time.
Developments in specifying retirement models reflect progress that
has been made along a number of lines. Most importantly, it has been
learned that because both the budget constraint and the indifference
map affecting behavior in any year are themselves affected by decisions
made in other years, the retirement decision must be analyzed in a life
cycle context rather than in a labor—leisure choice framework set
within a particular year.2 Moreover, despite the fact that most
empirical retirement studies are of the reduced form variety [e.g. see
Clark and Johnson (1981) and Boskin and Hurd (1978)], it has become
apparent that the underlying structural equations, and especially the
parameters of the utility function, must be estimated if we are to
determine the effects of a number of proposed policy changes such as
raising the early and normal ages for receipt of social security benefitsto 65 and 68, or rais.inq the minimum leqil iqe for mandatory retirement
to 70. Reduced form equations are unable to provide accurate estimates
of the impact of such changes both because of the difficulty of capturing
all the twists and turns in the budget line and because the proposed
changes take us outside the range of oast experience. Recently, a first
attempt was made to estimate a retirement model that is both structural
and is formulated in a life—cycle context. This is the important contri-
bution of Gordon and Blinder (1980).
Now that we have reached a point where the technical approach is on the
right track, it is appropriate to consider the specification of the
retirement model, and in particular the assumption as to the constraints
facing the potential retiree. Embedded in models used to estimate
utility function parameters are various assumptions regarding available
employment opportunities. One possibility is that individuals decide
each year whether to continue to work full-time or to retire completely
that year.4 Such an all-or-nothing work decision may be ascribed to
the interdependence of inputs in the production process, as noted by
Deardorf and Stafford (1976). Another approach assumes that individuals
choose their level of work effort in a particular job on a year by year
basis, and hence that individuals are free to retire by gradually
reducing their work effort over time. This kind of model was used by
Gordon and Blinder (1980). Combinations of the above two models are
also possible. An example of such a hybrid would posit that the
individual is constrained to work full-time or not at all in his main
job, but can work part-time in a partial retirement job at the penalty
of receiving a lower wage rate. As we shall see in this paper, this3
type of hybrid appears particularly attractive in view of the available
evidence.
Our earlier work (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1981) suggests, but only
indirectly, that constraints which force an individual to work at
least a minimum number of hours on the main job may play an important
role in the retirement process.5 Empirical evidence presented there
documents the importance of partial retirement in jobs other than
the primary job. Partial retirement is found to be a fairly common
phenomenon, with at least one third of those in our sample of older
workers having retired partially at one time or anotheL For workers
over 65, partial retirement was found to be as common as nonretirement.
But what is most consistent with a view that minimum hours con-
straints affect retirement behavior is the finding that those who
partially retire usually do not do so on jobs they held full-
time at age 55, despite the fact that these "main jobs" carryhigher
wage offers than do the newly acquired jobs held by the partially
retired.6 While these findings are consistent with a view that minimum
hours constraints on the main job influence retirement behavior, and
the magnitudes involved suggest that potentially this influence is
important, they of course do not provide direct evidence on either
(1) the pervasiveness of lower limit constraints on hours of work, or
(2) the impact of ignoring these constraints. In Section I below, we
attempt to document more directly that these constraints are a common
phenomenon.
Minimum hours constraints have important implications for studies of
retirement behavior because ignoring these constraints may lead to biased4
estimates of the parameters of the utility function. On the one hand,
since most people do not partially retire, they are observed o shift
their labor supply discontinuously from full-time work to full
retirement. Any analysis which does not incorporate a minimum hours
constraint must assume that this behavior is voluntary and attribute
it to some characteristic of the utility function. On the other hand,
a substantial fraction of older workers partially retirein jobs which
have reduced wages compared to the wages paid in the main job. An
analysis which ignores minimum hours constraints is likely toconsider
the drop in wages as exogenous and will attribute partial retirement
to a change in the budget constraint rather than to a shift in the
utility function over time. Section II considers the nature
of the bias in the estimated parameters of the utility function that
arises if there are minimum hours constraints and they are ignored, or
if partial retirement is mistakenly viewed as a result of an exogenous
drop in the wage rate rather than as an endogenous choice brought on by
minimum hours constraints in the main job.
If minimum hours constraints are ignored and utility function para-
metersare biased as a result, projections based on the estimates may lead
toincorrect predictions as to the course of retirement and to mistaken
analysis of the effects of changes in pension or social security policy.
Further, if the model treats partial retirement at reduced wages as a
response to an exogenous change in wage rate rather than as an endogenous
choice of a job with lower wages, it cannot be used to determine whether
those who postpone retirement as a result of some policy change remain in
main jobs, earning high incomes while competing with prime age workers5
or with those attempting to secure a job with training opportunities and
the potential of a fruitful long term relationship, or whether they are
putting in a limited number of hours on part—time jobs, competing with
secondary workers.
Such considerations underline the importance of obtaining accurate
estimates of utility function parameters based on properly specified
opportunity sets. In order to obtain such estimates, we are in the process
of analyzing a full structural model which incorporates a minimum hours
constraint. Some of the questions pertaining to the magnitude and direction
of the biases to be discussed in Section II can only be analyzed in the
context of that model. To set the stage for later empirical analysis,
Section III of this paper discusses the information available in three major
longitudinal data sets, each of which appears to have shortcomings for
use in an appropriately specified life cycle model.6
I. The Prevalence of Minimum Hours Constraints
In this section we will look at evidence pertaining to minimum
hours constraints. These are constraints which limit the opportunities
for an individual to work fewer hours than full—time in his current job.
Perhaps the best data source for examining the extent of these con-
straints in the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). The
PSID contained the following question: "Could you have worked less
if you had wanted to?" Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 tabulate the answers
to this question for several groups of males who were working, but
not self-employed. Unfortunately, a significant percentage of the
sample was not asked this question due to the routing pattern of the
questionaire; these people are included in the third column. The people
who were routed around this question had previously indicated that they
would have liked to work more on their present job but couldn't.
Column 4 calculates the number of employees who faced a minimum hours
constraint as a fraction of those for whom an answer could be deter-
mined.7
The overall impression gained from Table 1 is that minimum hours
constraints are a very common phenomenon. Line 1 of the table indicates
that 41 percent of prime—age males reported that they could not reduce
their hours of work. Of those for whom a response could be determined,
over half (56%) said that they do face such a constraint.
It should be recognized that these figures might understate thenumber of individuals subject to a minimum hours constraint due to the
nature of the question. For one thing, individuals may indicate that
there is downward flexibility in their hours of work even if they can
reduce hours only transitorily rather than permanently. For another,
individuals who work some amount of voluntary overtime might respond
that they could reduce their present work week
eventhough they would ultimately face a minirium hours
constraint. Line 2 of the table attempts to shed light
on thelattersource of downward bias in theindicatednumber of con-
strained individualsby including only individuals who usually worked
42 hours or less per week, and who presumably were less likely to be
working overtime than people working longer hours. With this sub-sample,
61% of those for whom a response could be determined reported that they
faced a minimum hours constraint, although the overall percentage
reporting a constraint remained the same as before, at 41%.
The implication of minimum hours constraints of concern here is
that they may affect retirement decisions by forcing an individual to
choose between full—time work on the main job, part-time work in another
job at lower wages, or complete retirement, rather than allowing some
intermediate amount of work effort in the same job at unchanged wages.
For this reason it is of interest to know how many people in an older
age range report that they are facing this kind of constraint.Line 3
of Table 1 reports this information for individuals aged 55 to 65, which
is the age range in our society when many people begin to consider
retirement. These figures do not show great differences from the
analogous figures for the younger age groups. The same is true forline 4 of the table, which reports the percentages facing minimum hours
constraints among individuals who are covered by pensions. Line 5 does
the same for union members and suggests that union members are somewhat
less likely to face these constraints than are non—union employees.
Table 2 breaks the responses down by occupation and industry,
again reporting results for prime—age males.8 These figures are largely
in accord with our expectations. Laborers (62% of those who responded to the
question) and operatives (59%) were most likely to be constrained,
and managers (at 49%) least likely. By industry, those most likely
to report a constraint are in the medical profession or in the army,
with 70% or more of the individuals responding to the question
reporting a constraint. There are eight other industries in which
60% or more of the responding individuals report a constraint.
Those least likely to report a constraint are in mining, paper,
transportation and communication, but even in these industries,
more than 40% of the responding individuals report a constraint.
A second data source with information on the extent of r.iinirnura
hours constraints is a 1979 survey with 267 responding organizations
by the American Society for Personnel Administration and the Bureau of
National Affairs (ASPA-BNA).9 Approximately one-half of the respond-
ing establishments are manufacturing companies, one—third non-
manufacturing business andaboutone—fifth nonbusiness organizations
(hospitals, universities, government organizations, etc.). According
to the survey, while over half of the firms make arrangements for some
employees to stay on as consultants, and sometimes recall retirees
for temporary assignment, only 15% of the responding firms, and only10% of the manufacturing firms, have a "tapering off" program in which
at least some employees can reduce their work time as they approach
retirement. Only 7% have such programs covering all employees. The
percentages are similar among large firms (more than 1000 employees)
and small firms (fewer than 1000 employees).
This survey thus gives the impression that the percentage of
individuals who are free to reduce hours immediately prior to
retirement is on the order of 10%, whereas the stdtistics from the
PSID suggest a substantially higher number. In the PSID survey,
it may be reasonably argued for individuals in the "not ascertained"
category that if a person cannot increase his work week, it is likely
that he also cannot reduce it, i.e., that most of these individuals
should be counted as facing a minimum hours constraint. Even so,
the PSID data would still indicate that a quarter to a third of
the individuals are free to reduce their hours of work. However,
the PSID question is sufficiently vague that it is difficult to be
sure that most of those who report no constraint can in fact reduce
their work time much, even if the sample is confined only to those who
normally work 42 hours or less per week. People might be able to take
a little more sick leave, or take a week or two without pay, or even to
reduce their work effort on the job a little, but there may nevertheless
be fairly strong limits to the extent to which work effort can be sub-
stantially reduced by these means.10
II. Implications for the Estimation of
Utility Function Parameters
In order to estimate the effects of changes in pension rules or
social security rules on retirement behavior, especially for large
changes in these programs, it is necessary to obtain estimates of the
parameters of the utility function which underlies retirement behavior.
Such parameters may be estimated in the context of a model which
hypothesizes that individuals maximize utility subject to a particular
opportunity set. The opportunity set is very much affected by whether
there is a minimum hours constraint. Accordingly, so are the utility
function parameter estimates. In this section we will illustrate how
inappropriate assumptions regarding a minimum hours constraint may
result in biased estimates of utility function parameters.
A. Biases From Ignoring a Minimum Hours Constraint.
First, suppose that most people are subject to a minimum hours
constraint, but that the investigator ignores it and instead assumes
that hours may be freely varied between full-time work and full-time
leisure. A common model which reflects the investigator's assumption
involves a lifetime utility function
(1) u =u[C(t),L(t), t] dt
which is maximized to subject to the budget constraint
(2) 4e_rtC(t) dt =A+4 e_rtw(t) [1 -L(t)]dt
where C(t) is consumption at time t, L(t) is leisure at time t11
[measured in units so that L(t) is in a ranqe from 0 to 1], A is
0
initialwealth, and W(t) is the wage rate at time t. The explicit
inclusion of time in the utility function reflects bothany discount
factors that may be appropriate and any changes in the relative
valuations of leisure and goods which arise because the marginal
disutility of work increases with age.
To estimate such a model, it is necessarJ first to specify
a functional form for the utility function and to introduce a
stochastic structure. With the present model, a straightforward way to
do this is to write the utility function as
(3)u[C(T),L(t), ti= {[C(t)]_+e+ E] [L(t)]}P
Thisis a CES utility function with elasticity G =l/(l+p),and
degree of homogeneity V. The relative valuations of consumption and
leisure depend on a set of exogenous variables in the vector X, and an
error term presumed to come from some specific distribution, e.g.
normal. Time (or age) is also incorporated in the vector X. For any
specific values of the parameters 13,V aridp, and for the set of exogenous
variables X for an individual in the sample, there is some value of £
forwhich the model predicts a value of labor supply just equal to the
amount which the individual does in fact supply. The probability
density of this value of Cisthe individual likelihood for this person.
Note that the required value of C,andhence the individual likelihood,
will be different for different values of the parameters 13,Vand p.
The maximum likelihood values of these parameters are simply the values
which maximize the product of the individual likelihoods for all the2
individuals in the sample, or in other words, the parameter values from
which the sample is most likely to have come. This is a relatively
easy procedure to outline, but it is a computationally burdensome pro-
cedure to implement. In practice, investigators frequently introduce
simplifications and assumptions to make the problem computationally more
tractable.
If the path of wages over time is reasonably stable, the model
specified above, a model with no constraints on hours worked, implies
a more or less gradual transition from full—time work to complete retire-
ment. If individuals are in fact subject to a minimum hours constraint,
however, we instead will observe a very rapid transition from full-time
work to retirement. The estimation procedure adjusts the estimates of
and p to maximize the likelihood function in view of these observa-
tions, and in the process of doing so it may produce biased estimates
of the parameters. To see the source of the bias, consider the labor
supply decision of an individual for a small time period around the
time of retirement, as Illustrated in Figure 1.10 Heuristically, the
estimation procedure may account in one of two ways for the rapid
transition from full—time work to complete retirement.
One possibility -atheoretical possibility that without firmer
behavioral grounding is not very plausible -isthat the indifference
curves exhibit a low or moderate elasticity of substitution between
earnings and leisure, but that the curves are rotated rapidly between
the time just before the individual retires and the time after he retires.
This is illustrated in the left panel of the figure. The substance of
this explanation is that something happens around the time of retirement13
that suddenly and greatly increases the individual's marginal disutility
of work. In an estimation procedure, the algorithm would associate
this behavior either with age or with some variable which changes rapidly
and uniformly across people and which could therefore account for this
kind of behavior. However, it cannot be attributed strictly to age,
since people retire at a variety of ages in the late fifties and
sixties, and there are unlikely to be explanatory variables which always
undergo a dramatic shift around the time of retirement. Hence, the
maximization algorithm is likely to focus on a second explanation,
namely that the elasticity of substitution is rather high, so that a
slight tilt of the indifference curves is enough to cause the sudden
shift of the point of tangency between the indifference curves and the
budget line. This situation is illustrated in the right panel of the
figure.
Ignoring a minimum hours constraint, then, is likely to produce a
rather high estimate for the within—period elasticity of substitution
between earnings and leisure. However, the estimation procedure must
find the general slope of the indifference curves to be close to the wage
rates for all individuals; otherwise for some individuals a small shift
in the slope of the indifference curves would be insufficient to make them
retire. Hence, the estimation procedure would tend to assign coefficients
to the explanatory variables so that the general slope of the indifference
curves in the right panel of the figure is close to the wage rate for as
many individuals as possible, and it would use the error termto
resolve any remaining discrepencies between the wage rate and the slope
of the indifference curves. This would bias the coefficients of the14
utility function toward values which are in fact appropriate more for
the wage equation.
A somewhat different bias can arise if the estimation procedure
utilizes only information about whether or not the individual has stopped
working, as in Gordon and Blinder (1980). In the absence of a minimum
hours constraint, the reservation wage is tangent to the indifference
curve at the point of no income and no work, as illustrated by the dotted
line which is tangent to the indifference curve at point A in Figure 2.
With a minimum hours constraint, the reservation wage is steeper than
the indifference curve at A. In the figure, point B corresponds to
the minimum hours of work if the individual chooses to work, and the
dashed line corresponds to the associated reservation wage. If the
actual wage were higher, then the individual could reach some point above
and to the left of B which is preferred to A, while if the wage were
less, point A would be preferred.
If the estimation procedure ignores the minimum hours constraint
when it is in fact present, the reservation wage represented by the
dashed line will be inferred to be the slope of the indifference curves
at A. Hence, the indifference curves will be estimated to be too steep.
If all jobs in a sample involve a minimum hours constraint, or if the
explanatory variables X in the utility function of equation (3) are
uncorrelated with the presence or absence of a minimum hours constraint,
then the only bias may be that the constant term in the linear form X
is estimated too high. If some of the explanatory variables are
correlated with the presence or absence of the constraint, however, then
estimates of other parameters may also be biased. Suppose, for example,15
that people with high education are more likely to be in jobs without
a minimum hours constraint. That means that such people are more
likely than average to have a budget line represented by the dotted
line in Figure 2. The estimation procedure will infer that high educa-
tion tends to be associated with flatter indifference curves, all other
things equal, and this will bias the coefficient of education in X in
Equation (3) downward.
B.Biases From Treating the Wage Decline Associated with Partial
Retirement Jobs as Exogenous
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section should
lead one to question the plausibility of any assumption that individuals
are free to reduce gradually their working hours at unchanged wages as
they approach retirement. Just the opposite assumption might seem to be
more defensible on the basis of the evidence. The fraction of indivi-
duals who are free to reduce their working hours appears to be no more
than 40% and perhaps as little as one-tenth. Particularly if this latter
figure is closer to the truth, it can be argued that an empirical investi-
gation based on a model which assumes that everyone is constrained would
11
be acceptable.
However, our earlier work casts doubt on a model which assumes that
everyone works in a job with fixed working hours until a certain age,
and then retires completely. That work, based on the Retirement
History Survey, found that almost a quarter to a third of the individuals
in the sample spent at least some time in partial retirement, usually
in a job other than the one at which they had worked for most of their1.6
lives. Such a finding suggests that an older person nearing retirement
age does not face a simple dichotomous choice between complete retire-
ment and a full—time job. Rather, he faces a three—way choice between
complete retirement, full—time work in his primary job, and part—time
work, probably at a lower wage, in a different "partial retirement" job.
In such a setting, public and private pensions aside, the wage rate
in the full-time job is not a true measure of the opportunity cost of
leaving that job. If the individual quits the full—time job and works
in the partial retirement job, the opportunity cost is the difference
in utility levels between the full—time work,high wage package available
on the main job and the part—time work, lower wage option available if
partial retirement is elected.'2 One would suspect that failure to
allow for the partial retirement option would bias estimates of the
parameters of the utility function. The nature of such a bias can be
demonstrated. To begin, Figure 3 compares the hypothetical labor
supplies of the same individual for two different environments, one in
which the individual has the opportunity to work at reduced hours in
a second job and one where this opportunity is lacking. Time B is the
time when the individual retires from the job if he has no alternatives
to the full-time job. If an alternative job is available, time A is
the time when the individual leaves the full-time job, and time C is
the time when the individual leaves the partial retirement job. It is
also possible that if the wage on the partial retirement job is low
enough in comparison to the wage on the full-time job, the job is so
unattractive as to be irrelevant. In this case, the individual would
continue to retire at time B whether or not the alternative job were17
available.
The figure is drawn so that time A occurs before time B, and
time B before time C.It can be shown that this is indeed the case
for a wide variety of commonly—used utility functions. In particular,
for a utility function that is homogeneous in consumption and leisure,
a sufficient condition for this result is that 1 —(1/a)< v < 1,
where G is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
and V is the degree of homogeneity. Note that this relation will be
satisfied by any utility function, such as the Cobb-Douglas or the
C.E.S. function, that is homogeneous of degree one, or by any function
where both the elasticity of substitution and V are less than one.
To sketch how this result arises, suppose that the two paths were
such that time A occurred after time B. Let MU be the marginal
utility of discounted lifetime income along the solid path (i.e., with
no partial retirement), and consider the implications of this same MU
along the dashed path (with partial retirement). With the condition
1 —(1/a)< v<1, the MTJ for which lifetime consumption just equals
lifetime income (properly discounted) along the solid path must cause
13
lifetime income to exceed lifetime consumption along the dashed path.
This means that MU1 the marginal utility of lifetime income, must be
lower along the dashed path than along the solid path. Between time B
and time A, the individual would be working and earning income along
the dashed path but not along the solid path, in spite of the fact that
the marginal utility of income is lower along the former than along the
latter path.14 This inconsistency contradicts the hypothesis that time
B precedes time A and establishes that the termination of full-time work18
occursearlier if a partial retirement job is available. A symmetric
argument establishes that time B does indeed precede time C, that
is, that the person completely retires later if a partial retirement
job is available and taken.
Now suppose that X. is a variable which does not influence the prefer-
ences of individuals but which is positively correlated to wage differentials
between full-time and partial retirement jobs. For example, an accountant
(X.=l) may have skills which are reasonably transferrable to typical part-
time jobs in the service industry, but a production worker on a specific
assembly line (X. =0)maynot.In this situation, a person who has a low
value of X. and hence a low wage in the partial retirement job may find
such a job irrelevant and will work in the full-time job up until complete
retirement. A person with a high value of X., and hence a higher wage in
the partial retirement job, is more likely to find that job attractive
enough to work at it for some period of time.
To see the source of bias from an estimation procedure that imposes
a minimum hours constraint but ignores partial retirement, turn to
Figure 4. Notice first that this figure is drawn consistent with the
assumption by the investigator that hours are fixed at full time, and
therefore that leisure can be affected only by adjusting the date of
retirement. That is, this figure illustrates how the indifference curves
which assume full—time work appear to the investigator when, contrary
to his assumption, the partial retirement option is available;
it should not be interpreted as the appropriate diagram for analyzing
the labor supply decision when hours are in fact variable.
Consider now two individuals who have identical wages in their full—19
time jobs andwho are otherwise identica1 save that one hasa low value of X.
and does not work in a partial retirement job while the other has a high value of
X. and does partially retire. Figure 4 illustrates how the estimation
algorithm views these two individuals, who will be denoted as I and II,
respectively. For individual I, the budget constraint has a slope
equal to the wage rate in the full-time job until the time of retirement
B, and the unobserved budget constraint past that point is assumed
to continue at more or less the same slope. In fitting utility
function parameters, an estimation procedure will infer that the
indifference curves of individual I are tangent to his budget constraint
at time B. This indifference curve is labelled as I in the figure.
For individual II, the observed budget constraint consists of one
segment with a slope equal to the full-time wage until time A, when he
leaves the full-time job, and another segment between time A and time
C which has a slope equal to the wage in the partial retirement job.
The unobserved budget constraint past that point is usually assumed
to have a slope similar to the slope in the last observed job, resulting
in a complete budget constraint for this individual which is indicated
by the dashed line in Figure 3 and labelled II. If time C is taken as
the date of retirement for this individual, a procedure which attempts
to estimate utility function parameters will infer that the indifference
curves are tangent to budget line II at that point. Hence, the
indifference curves will be presumed to look something like the curve
labelled as II in the figure.
Many utility functions commonly used in estimation (e.g., Cobb-
Douglas, C.E.S.) are homothetic, that is, they have the same slope along20
any ray from the origin. If such functions are used the estimation
algorithm will observe that the slope of the indifference curve I
along the ray labelled M is steeper than the indifference curve II
along the ray labelled N. If ray N is steeper than ray M, this can
occur for convex indifference curves only if the curves for individual
I are rotated relative to the curves for II in such a way that the first
set of curves display a higher relative preference for leisure. Since
this is observed to be correlated with X. and since the two individuals
1
arein all other respects identical, the estimation procedure will
impute a negative effect of X. on the relative preference for leisure
in the utility function, even though X. does not enter the utility
function at all. Hence, a failure to consider an alternative partial
retirement job in the estimation procedure can produce biased estimates
of the parameters of the utility function. An analogous argument for bias
can be made if X. is a variable which, for other reasons, truely
belongs in theutilityfunction.
C. A Model With Partial Retirement.
Since many individuals appear to face fixed hours constraints
on their full-time jobs but are able to work part—time by taking partial
retirement jobs at lower wages, some blend of the previous two
models is necessary to avoid the biases which either alone would
produce. In this hybrid model, there are two jobs. One has a
constraint on the number of hours worked, and the other has a
lower wage rate than the first, but does not have any constraints
on hours worked. An optimizing individual in this model would
maximize the lifetime discounted utility function
T
u=4, u[C(t),L(t), t] dt









where H.(t) and W(t) are hours worked and wages in the 1th job, and
where all other variables are the same as defined previously. The
first constraint says that time not spent at leisure is split between
the two jobs, and the third constraint says that the time is allocated
entirely to one or the other job. The second constraint is the
familiar budget constraint, and the last equation limits any time
spent in the first job to full—time work or none at all. An
estimation procedure built around the (non-trivial) solution to this
problem will avoid the problems of bias which would arise if the
possibility of individuals working in partial retirement jobs is
ignored.
III. Considerations of Available Data
Ideally, an estimation procedure should consider, for each
individual, the opportunity set that individual is facing. This
includes the wage history in the individual's full—time job, whether
or not he can reduce hours in that job, and potential wages in any
relevant partial retirement jobs. For each person, the individual
likelihood would be calculated based on the model appropriate to
that individual, and the likelihoods would then be multiplied to
yield an overall likelihood function which could be maximized with
respect to the parameters of the utility function. Unfortunately,
this procedure makes considerable demands on the data, and no data
source is currently available which would enable this procedure to
implemented in a completely satisfactory manner. In this section, we22
will discuss the relative advantages and disadvantages of three
of the major microeconomic data sets which might be used in the
estimation process. These three data sets are the Retirement History
Survey (RHS), the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
and the National Longitudinal Study of Mature Men (NLS) .Six
aspects of these surveys are particularly relevant to researchers
trying to estimate parameters relevant to retirement behavior.
1. Hours Limitations.ThePSID has by far thebestinformation
on hours limitations in current jobs. On two of Its surveys the NLS
asked whether the individual wished to reduce hours but couldn't.
The answers to this question indicate that. only a relatively small
number of individuals felt such a constraint to be binding (13% in 1971
and 7% in 1976), but it must be noted that this question asked whether
an individual wished to reduce hours, whereas the PSID questioncited
earlier asked whether an individual could reduce hours if he wanted to.
No information on hours constraints is available from the PITS.
2. Retirement. Both the NLS and the RHS attemptto
findout iftheindividual is subject to mandatory retirement
provisions.The NLSquestionsalways pertain to the current job.
In the first year of the RHS, if the individual already considered
himself to be retired or partially retired, the survey inquired
about mandatory retirement provisions on the last job on which the
individual worked full-time, which is closer to the information
that is really being sought. No information on mandatory retirement
is available from the PSID.
3. Pension Coverg. All three surveys inquire about pension23
coverage. TheRIISand the NLSdo:0everyyear, whereas the PS.LD
asks about such coverage only in one of the later years. The RHS
additionallyasks each year the ages that individuals will be eligible
for normal and early retirement in their current jobs. The NLS
inquires about early retirement only in two years, but in those
years it asks the expected pension amounts both for normal retirement
andfor early retirement. These are the kinds of figures which
are necessary to calculate the increment of pension wealth due to
working between these dates [the DELTA used by Burkhauser and
Quinn (1981)]. Unfortunately, these questions are only sporadically
answered, and the quality of the answers is open to considerable
doubt.
4.Wage History. All three surveys ask about the wage rate
each year in the current job. The RHS additionally provides several
pieces of information relevant to constructing a wage history.
One piece of information is a matched Social Security record which
gives on a year by year basis the amount of Social Security covered
earnings. The RHS also asks about wages in the first and immediately
previous jobs, and it inquires about the ages at which the respondent
earned one-third and one-half of his 1971 salary.
5• partial Retirement Jobs. The PHS each year
contains a question whether the individual considers himself to be
completely retired, partially retired, or not retired at all. This
question can be useful in distinguishing a movement from a full—
time job into a partial retirement job as opposed to a movement from
one full-time job into another full—time job. In the other surveys,
the distinction between these two movements must be made on the
basis of a drop either in usual hours worked per year or in the wage24
rate (A lower wage rate may indicate an easier partial retirement job).
The distinction will therefore contain a degree of arbitrariness
and may be subject to a considerable margin of error.
6. Sample size. The RHS contains about 11,000 individuals
initially aged 58-63, and it surveys them bianually starting in
1969. This survey clearly provides the most observations in the
relevant age range (the early and mid 60's) for studies of retirement
behavior. The NLS surveys about 5,000 individuals initially aged
45—59 for a period of 10 years from 1966 to 1976, which means that
it includes several thousand individuals during their early and mid
60's. The PSID covers more than 5,000 hoursholds, but with no particu-
lar restrictions on the ages of the individuals. As a result, it has
considerably fewer observations of people in the relevant age range
than do the other two surveys.
Noneof these data sets allows for a complete specification
of the budget constraint. The PSID provides some information about
thepresence or absence of a minimum hours constraint but contains
no information on mandatory retirement. The RHS and the NLS indicate
whether or not the individual faces mandatory retirement, but of
these two only the NLS contains any information on minimum hours
constraints, and very fragmentary evidence at that. Hence it is
not possible to ascribe to each individual the correct budget
constraint, and some other method must be used to obtain estimated
parameters.
If one believes that the percentage of individuals who do
face minimum hours constraints is as high as 90 percent, as maybe implied
by the ASPR-BNA study, a reasonable approximation maybe to treat
everyone as though they were subject to thisconstraint in their25
primary job unless there is obviou:; evidcncc to the contrary, such
as an individual who actually reduces work effort without changing
jobs. This procedure would mistreat some individuals who are not
subject to the constraint, but if the number of individuals so
mistreated is fairly small, one may use surveys such as the RHS
and NLS and hope that the impact of these individuals on parameter
estimates is not large.
A more sophisticated but more complicated procedure would be
to use the information from one survey on the relative percentages
of individuals subject to fixed hours constraints as a priori
information in an estimation based on data from another survey.
For instance, let fC(3, x.) be the individual likelihood for individual
I using a model where he faces the constraint, and fC(13, X.) be the
likelihood for the same individual using a model where he does not
face the constraint. Now suppose that from the PSID is determined
the fraction PC of the individuals from a particular industry-
occupation classification who are subject to a minimum hours constraint.
Then, when forming the likelihood for an individual in the BUS or
NLS, the likelihood could be written as
X,) + (1 —p)fC(3 x.)
where the likelihood with each model is weighted by the probability
that the model is correct. This procedure is probably necessary if
the number of individuals who are not subject to the constraint is
closer to the forty percent figure rather than the one—tenth.
(In the latter case, the improvement in estimates from using the more
complicated estimation procedure may be relatively small.) It also
improves if one can find some exogenous variables which are strongly26
correlated with the probability PC and hence which can be used to establish
which individuals have a PC close to one and which individuals have a
probability close to zero.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Considerable progress has been made in our efforts to understand
retirement behavior, and the impact on this behavior of pensions, social
security and other features of the labor market which affect the rewards
to work. To predict the course of retirement behavior under unchanging
pension and social security programs, or to predict the effects of con-
templated changes in pension and social security systems, an appropriately
specified structural model is required. This discussion has pointed out
fundamental deficiencies in the structure of currently available supply
side models of retirement behavior.
A principal finding of the descriptive statistics of this paper is
that any model which supposes that people are free to reduce hours on
their main job as they near retirement age is very substantially at odds
with the facts. However, the opposite assumption, that all jobs have
minimum hours constraints, is not completely tenable either in view of
the fact that around one-third of individuals partially retire at one
time or another during their lives. For individuals who do face minimum
hours constraints in their main jobs, another route is open to reduce
work effort, namely, to take another job, probably at a lower wage, which
does not entail this constraint. We have shown that parameter estimates
which are made in the context of a complete structural model under the
assumption that hours in the main job are freely variable may overstate27
the elasticity of substitution and/or create biases in the estimates of
other parameters in the utility, function. An upward bias in estimates
of the elasticity of substitution may lead to an overstatement of the
sensitivity of hours of work to changes in the parameters of pension
and social security programs)6 Parameter estimates made in the con-
text of a model which ignores the possibilities for partial retirement
are also subject to error, but the direction of this error depends on
the correlation of the omitted hours constraints with elements shifting
the utility function.
More exact answers as to the size of biases involved must await the
estImation of a structural model which incorporates explicitly a minimum
hours constraint in the main job, at least for a substantial fraction
of the population. To estimate such a model, the data problems noted
above must be overcome.As noted at the outset, such a model, once
estimated, can help to answer .a number of important policy related ques-
tions about the future course of retirement, the impact of changes in
pension and social security programs on retirement behavior, and the
substitution of older workers for groups such as women and youth whose
labor market opportunities have been of special concern to policy makers.28
FOOTNOTES
1. For a recent survey of the relevant literature, see Mitchell
and Fields (1982).
2. Pellechjo (1981), Burkhauser and Quinn (1981) and others discuss
interdependence over time in the budget equation. MaCurdy (1981) dis-
cusses relevant aspects of the life cycle utility function.
3.The Gordon—Blinder analysis does not quite provide structural
estimated for a complete life-cycle model. They consider a three—period
model in which the three periods are "past," "present," and "future."
Assuming full-time work in the past, they derive two formulae for the
reservation wage in the present, depending on whether or not the individual
works in the future. Whether or not the individual works in the future,
however, depends on the very parameters they are trying to estimate.
Hence, Gordon and Blinder face a bit of the chicken-and—egg problem:
the proper reservation wage equation to use for a particular individual
depends on the parameter values, but in order to estimate the parameter
values, they must already know which equation applies to each individual.
In their empirical estimation, Gordon and Blinder sidestep this problem
by using a reservation wage equation which is a compromise of the two
derived reservation equatiqns, without trying to decide which one is right
for particular person. This compromise permits them to derive parameter
estimates much more easily than would otherwise be possible, but at an
unknown cost in terms of the reliability of those estimates.
4.For a related theoretical analysis, see Burbidge and Robb
(1980).5. It should be recognized throughout thisdiscussionthat pension
rules, mandatory retirement provisions and even provisions of social
security benefits are not exogenous to retirement behavior, although
they may be exogenous to the discussions of any particular individual.
Early retirement benefits and mandatory retirement provisions have been
viewed as outcomes of an employment contract, rather than as exogenous
influences on the contractual relation (Lazear, 1979, 1981). The Social
Security program is increasingly being influenced by retirement behavior
of the growing number of older workers. Moreover, the literature on
unions and compensation laws traditionally treated pensions as an outcome
of the wage and employment process (Gustman and Segal, 1972 and 1977).
6.One might argue that this observation simply reflects mandatory
retirement rules and pension regulations which limit collection of
benefits to those who have left the covered job. However, we found that
the relative frequency of partial retirement outside of the main job
remains high even for those who are not subject to mandatory retirement
on their main job, who have no pension in their main job, and who have
no health problem. An alternative, but not mutually exclusive explanation
for the prevalence of partial retirement outside the main job is that
jobs taken outside the main job are much less difficult to perform than
are the main jobs and this lower work effort requirement is much more
highly valued by older workers.
7.Later waves of the surveys, unavailable to us at the time this
paper was written, corrected this defect in the routine pattern of the
questionnaire.0. A similar table for 55—65ycar—olds,notreportedlierc,
indicated a relation between the two age groups in the disaggregated
data comparable to the relation between lines 2 and 3 in Table 1.
9. Survey No. 39, entitled Retirement Policies and Programs.
10.The location of the indifference curves in this diagram depends
on the marginal utility of income during the period, which in turn
depends on the amount of income earned in other periods, and through
that on wage rates and labor supply decisions in other periods. This
dependence of the indifference curves on the individual's marginal
utility of income is the factor that renders this income—leisure diagram
invalid as the sole tool for the analysis of retirement behavior.
11.The fixed hours model simply adds the additional cdnstraint
L(t)[1 —L(t)]=0to the previous modeL An alternative way to formu-
late this model is to hypothesize that the individual maximizes
Uu(Y, R) subject to the budget constraint Y =A0
+ W(t)dt
where Y is income, R is year of retirement, N is the lifetime, and other
variables are as defined before.
12. For a discussion of the variation over the life cycle in
wages for work in the primary job and for work while partially retired,
see Gustman and Steinmeier (1982). Implications of partial retirement
for wage profiles as conventionally estimated are also discussed in
that paper.
13. At each point in time, consumption along an optimal path must
satisfy the relationship u[C(t),L(t),tj =ke
rtwhere u is the
partial derivative or u with respect to consumption and k is a constant
which may be interpreted as the marginal utility of discounted lifetimeincome. With the condition given in the text, itmaybeshownthat for
a constant k, the value of C(t) whichsatisfiesthis equation at any point
in time is positively related to L(t). Thus for a given value of k
(Mu)1work(and therefore income) would be greater along the dashed
pathunderthe hypothesis that time B precedes time A, and consumption
would be lower.
14. The fact that the individual chooses leisure along the solid
path between time B and time A implies that u[C1(t), 1, tI —ketc(t)
>u[C(t),0, tJ +kert[W(t)—C0(t)],where C1 is the amount consumed
when leisure is chosen and C0 is consumption when full—time work is chosen,
and where C1(t) satisfies the equationin the previous footnote for the
given t. Using the condition given in the text, it can be shown that
this relationship continues to hold for lower values of k. Hence, between
time B and time A, a lower value of k along the dashed path cannot induce
the individual to switch from complete retirement to full—time work.
15. Remember that, according to the model being analyzed, indif—
ference curve II is assumed by the investigator to he associated with
full—time work.
16Errors in measuring thewage offer variable, errors which are
traceable to misspecification of the opportunity set from ignoring partial
retirement1 may create a bias in the opposite direction. For a discussion,
see Gustman and Steinmeier (1982).32
REFERENCES
Boskin, Michael J, and Hurd, Michael D., "The Effect of Social Security
on Early Retirement," Journal of Public Economics, 1978, 10, 361—377.
Burbidge, John B., and Robb, A. Leslie, "Pensions and Retirement Behavior,"
Canadian Journal of Economics, August 1980, 13, 421-437.
Burkhauser, Richard and Quinn, Joseph, "The Effect of Changes in Mandatory
Retirement Rules on the Labor Supply of Older Workers," mimeo, 1980.
Clark, Robert L. and Johnson, Thomas, "Retirement In Dual Career Families."
Mimeographed, North Carolina State University, June 1980.
Deardorff, Alan V. and Stafford, Frank P., "Compensation of Cooperating
Factors," Econometrica, July 1976, 44, 671—684.
Gordon, Roger H., and Blinder, Alan S., "Market Wages, Reservation Wages
and Retirement," Journal of Public Economics, 1980, 14, 277—308.
GustBlan, Alan L. and Segal, riartin, "Interstate Variations in Teachers'
Pensions," Industrial Relations, October, 1977, 16, 335—344.
_____________________"Wages,Wage Supplements and the Interaction of
Union Bargains in the Construction Industry," Industrial and Labor
Relations Review, January, 1972, 25, 179—185.
Gustman, Alan L. and Steinmeier, Thomas L., "Partial Retirement and the
Analysis of Retirement Behavior," National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper Number 763, September, 1981.
"Partial Retirement and Wage Profiles,"
mimeo, June1982.
Mitchell, Olivia S. andFields,Gary S., "The Effects of Pensions and
Earningson Retirement in Review Essay," in R. Ehrenberg, editor,3H
Research In LaborEconomics,1982, 5, (forthcoming).
Pellechio, Anthony J., "Social Security and the Decision to Retire," mimeo








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table2: Probability that T:ime at Work Cannot Be Reduced,
by Occupation and Industrya
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cannot Can Reduce Not (1)
Reduce Hours Hours Ascertained (l)+(2)
By Occupation
Professional, Technical, and Kindred .47 .40 .12 .54
Managers, Oficials, Proprietors .46 .48 .06 .49
Clerical and Sales .42 .31 .26 .58
Craftsmen, Foremen, and Kindred .35 .35 .29 .50
Operatives .38 .26 .37 .59
Laborers .37 .23 .39 .62
Total (including NEC) .41 .32 .27 .56
By Industry
Agriculture .40 .25 .35 .62
Mining .31 .42 .27 .42
Metals .32 .33 .35 .49
Machinery, mci. Elec. .40 .37 .23 .52
Motor Vehicles .36 .29 .35 .55
Other Durables .37 .33 .30 .53
Food .43 .22 .34 .66
Tobacco .44 .26 .30 .63
Textiles, Apparel and Shoes .43 .23 .33 .6536
Paper .29 .39 .31 .43
Chemicals, Petroleum, Rubber
and Plastic .41 .29 .28 .59
Other Nondurables .44 .26 .29 .63
Construction .32 .29 .38 .52
Transportation .33 .39 .27 .46
Communication .37 .41 .22 .47
Other Public Utilities .43 .31 .26 .58
Retail .43 .36 .21 .54
Wholesale .38 .39 .23 .49
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate .47 .35 .17 .57
Repair Services .34 .37 .28 .48
Business Services .45 .22 .33 .67
Personal Services .31 .35 .35 .47
Amusement .39 .37 .23 .51
Printing .46 .29 .25 .61
Medical .54 .23 .23 .70
Education .44 .38 .18 .54
Professional Other than Medical or
Education .42 .40 .18 .51
Army .60 .25 .16 .71
Government .48 .28 .23 .63
Total mci. NEC. .41 .32 .27 .56
aSee footnote to Table 1.Figure 1. Alternative Explanations for a Sudden Transition
Between Full—Time Work and Retirement.
Legend: Indifference Curves in Period Before Retirement__________












Legend: Reservation Wage with no minimum Hours Constraint








Figure3. Labor Supply with and without a Second Job Lacking




Legend: Labor Supply with Single Job with Fixed Hours__________




Figure4. Potential Bias Arising From the Failure to Consider a Partial
Retirement Job
Income
,M
I